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Wholes and subparts in visual processing of
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Institute of Medical Sciences, Aberdeen Medical School, University of Aberdeen, Foresterhill, Aberdeen AB25 2ZD, UK
The human visual system is remarkably sensitive to stimuli conveying actions, for example the ﬁghting
action between two agents. A central unresolved question is whether each agent is processed as a whole in
one stage, or as subparts (e.g. limbs) that are assembled into an agent at a later stage. We measured the
perceptual impact of perturbing an agent either by scrambling individual limbs while leaving the
relationship between limbs unaffected or conversely by scrambling the relationship between limbs while
leaving individual limbs unaffected. Our measurements differed for the two conditions, providing
conclusive evidence against a one-stage model. The results were instead consistent with a two-stage
processing pathway: an early bottom-up stage where local motion signals are integrated to reconstruct
individual limbs (arms and legs), and a subsequent top-down stage where limbs are combined to represent
whole agents.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Theories of object recognition fall between two main
strategies: recognition-as-a-whole, whereby the entire
object is matched to a ﬂexible internal representation
based on invariant properties and/or alignment to stored
models, and recognition-by-parts, whereby the object is
decomposed into simple and meaningful subparts that are
then assembled into an abstract (typically hierarchical)
representation of their relationship within the object of
interest (Ullman 1996). For the speciﬁc example of
recognizing a moving human agent and interpreting his/
her actions, recognition-as-a-whole may happen by match-
ing the stimulus to a stored database of whole-body
silhouettes that represent each pose of a large set of actions
(Lange & Lappe 2006), while recognition-by-parts may
happen via decomposition of the stimulus into simple
elements such as individual body joints or limbs (Marr &
Vaina 1982). At present, there is no conclusive experi-
mental evidence to support either strategy.
The main difﬁculty in approaching this issue
experimentally is that most stimulus manipulations affect
both recognition strategies, making it difﬁcult to target
them separately. For example, human agents are often
scrambled for the purpose of measuring human sensitivity
to agency. The scrambling schemes that have been used so
far are relatively aspeciﬁc, typically involving spatial
(Cutting 1981; Profﬁtt & Bertenthal 1990; Grossman &
Blake 2001, 2002) or temporal (Profﬁtt & Bertenthal
1990; Blake et al. 2003; Neri et al. 2006) disruption of
individual joints, a manipulation that affects the structure
of the whole body as well as its subparts. In the few
instances where scrambling spared individual limbs
(Pinto & Shiffrar 1999; Thompson et al. 2005), it
disrupted the agent to an extent that the nature of the
stimulus and the recognition task were modiﬁed signi-
ﬁcantly, making the results hard to interpret in the context
of the distinction between the two recognition strategies
and their potential contribution to the common task of
identifying the agent.
In order to address this issue, we designed a scrambling
protocol that allows independent manipulation of the
whole body and its subparts (arms and legs) for a motion-
tracked sequence that approximates agency more veridi-
cally than the stereotyped locomotion patterns used in
most previous studies. Central to our experimental design,
the same amount of overall disruption was applied with
both manipulations, allowing us to make clear-cut
predictions for how the experimental measurements
should turn out under the recognition-as-a-whole or the
recognition-by-parts hypotheses. The results unambi-
guously rejected the former, and were best interpreted
within a two-stage model for the processing of agency.
Furthermore, they demonstrate that the drop in human
sensitivity caused by inverting the agents upside
down (Sumi 1984; Pavlova & Sokolov 2000; Neri et al.
2007) is not observed under all conditions as suggested
by previous studies, but is dependent upon which
stage in the processing hierarchy is probed by the
scrambling manipulation.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Visual stimuli
We motion captured the x–y–t coordinates of 26 body
markers during a 22.7 s sequence of ﬁghting between two
martial arts athletes (Neri et al. 2006, 2007). There were 13
markers on each actor: one on the head; two shoulders; two
elbows; two wrists; two hips; two knees; and two feet. Head
markers were discarded, leaving 24 joint trajectories corre-
sponding to four limbs on each agent. Of these, only three
limbs (randomly selected) per agent were sampled on any
given instance of the stimulus for a total of two agents!3
limbs!3 jointsZ18 joint trajectories. Balancing the design
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that the number of joints per limb was equal to the number of
limbs, making it necessary to exclude one limb. Each stimulus
was constructed by randomly selecting a 1.5 s segment from
the sequence. The selected segment was displayed using a
limited lifetime sampling technique whereby the 18 tra-
jectories were randomly sampled by nine dots (4.6 arcmin
diameter) that lived for only 120 ms (matching the temporal
integration window of local motion detectors; Burr 1980),
after which they sampled a different trajectory. Dot
appearance and disappearance was asynchronous across
dots to avoid motion transients from simultaneous transitions
of all sampling dots (see Neri et al. (1998) and ﬁlm in the
electronic supplementary material; see also ﬁg. 1i in Neri
et al. (2006) for a detailed diagram showing how limited
lifetime sampling plays out in the frame-to-frame ﬁlm
sequence). Dots could be randomly bright (74 cd m
K2)
or dark (0 cd m
K2)o nag r e y( 3 7 c d m
K2) background
(ensuring that no change in mean luminance ever took
place in our experiments) but did not change colour during
their lifetime. The trajectories were sized so that their overall
centre of mass (across the entire sample) was centred on an
Iiyama monitor driven by a VSG graphics card (Cambridge
Research Systems), and they did not extend outside a
6.48!6.48 region. Observers ﬁxated on a central marker at
57 cm distance from the monitor (ﬁxation was only loosely
enforced). All were naive except author P.N. (indicated by the
rightward-pointing triangle in ﬁgures 2 and 3).
(b) Trial structure and psychophysical task
Each trial consisted of two 1.5 s intervals, one containing the
target stimulus and the other containing the non-target
stimulus (in random order), separated by a 1 s blank interval.
Observers pressed a button to indicate the target interval
(temporal two alternative forced choice design) and triggered
thenext trial after receiving feedback. The target stimuluswas
generated as described in §2a. The non-target stimulus was
generated by a similar procedure, but was further subjected to
temporal scrambling of the trajectories (see §2c). Each trial
belonged to one of four types: upright limb scrambling;
upright body scrambling; inverted limb scrambling; and
inverted body scrambling. Inverted trials were obtained by
inverting both target and non-target stimuli upside down with
respect to the centre of the display. The four trial types were
mixed within the same block for most data collection (four
separate staircases were run in parallel); we also collected data
where we blocked upright and inverted trials separately (limb
and body scrambling were mixed in all experiments). We did
not observe signiﬁcant differences in the thresholds estimated
using these two procedures and we therefore combined the
data for the analysis presented here. Observers were
introduced to the task by showing them a noiseless
version of the entire ﬁghting sequence with an unlimited
lifetime of the dots. They were then explicitly instructed to
indicate which interval resembled more closely a ﬁghting
action between two human agents similar to the one they had
been shown.
(c) Scrambling manipulations
In the non-target interval, we scrambled individual tra-
jectories by randomly shifting the sampling segment with
respect to the originally selected segment (indicated by
the grey rectangle in ﬁgure 1) within a temporal window
of width W centred on the originally selected segment
(Neri et al. 2006). We express scrambling strength as
(WKS)/S (the same deﬁnition used in Bu ¨lthoff et al.
(1998) for depth scrambling), where S is stimulus duration
(width of the grey rectangle). Scrambling could be applied
either between (ﬁgure 1c,d) or within (ﬁgure 1e,f ) limbs. We
describe the procedure for one agent as both agents were
similarly manipulated. The nine joint trajectories (3 limbs!3
joints) corresponding to each agent were grouped into three
triplets (indicated by three different colours in ﬁgure 1c–f )
according to one of two schemes: all joints within a given
triplet came from the same limb (body-scrambling condition,
ﬁgure 1c–d), or all joints within a given triplet came from
different limbs (limb-scrambling condition, ﬁgure 1e–f ). For
the latter scheme, which joint from which limb was paired
with which joint from a different limb was selected randomly
(one speciﬁc example is shown in ﬁgure 1e,f, but wepresented
all possible groupings on different trials). After joints were
grouped into triplets, joints belonging to the same triplet were
scrambled by the same random amount but different triplets
were scrambled by different amounts (indicated by the
coloured arrows in ﬁgure 1d,f ).
(d) Threshold measurements
For measuring scrambling thresholds (ﬁgure 2a), we
determined the percentage of correct target identiﬁcations
as a function of scrambling strength (using a two-up, one-
down staircase) and applied probit analysis to obtain the
threshold estimate (Finney 1971). We also analysed the
standard deviation of the best-ﬁt cumulative Gaussian (which
reﬂects the slope of the psychometric curve); this was on
average one-third of the threshold, and was not statistically
different (pO0.05 for all paired t-tests) between any of the
conditions we tested. For measuring time thresholds
(ﬁgure 3), we selected a large scrambling level and kept it
unchanged (this was typically 2–3!the threshold level
estimated in ﬁgure 2a; it was not always possible to use the
same multiplicative factor across different observers because
for some of them this resulted in scrambling levels that
exceeded the range afforded by the stimulus). We then
adopted the same procedure and analysis used for scrambling
thresholds to determine time thresholds. For time thresholds,
the best-ﬁt standard deviation consistently scaled with
threshold (i.e. it differed between the two scrambling
conditions at p!0.01) and was roughly 0.4 of the threshold
value. Psychometric curves for both threshold types could be
characterized robustly because the experimental design
allowed both 50 (chance) and 100 per cent points to be
easily obtained in both cases by manipulating the relevant
parameter. More speciﬁcally, for scrambling thresholds, the
50 per cent point corresponds to zero scrambling strength by
deﬁnition. As scrambling strength was increased to large
levels, the non-target could be easily discriminated from the
target by all observers and accuracy reached 100 per cent.
Similarly, the scrambling strengths selected for the time
threshold experiments were such that, with long temporal
exposures, the non-target was easily discriminated from the
target at 100 per cent correct performance.
3. RESULTS
(a) Discriminability is better for limb scrambling
than body scrambling
Observers were asked to discriminate a target stimulus
from a non-target stimulus on every trial (two-alternative
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sequence between two point-light agents (Neri et al. 2006;
we used two agents in an effort to preserve the natural
structure of the stimulus, but we expect that our results
would extend to stimuli containing only one agent). The
non-target stimulus was obtained by scrambling the
temporal relationship of the dots sampling the ﬁghters
(see §2). On different trials, scrambling could be applied
either to joints within the same limb while preserving the
relationship between limbs (‘limb-scrambling’ condition)
or between limbs while preserving the relationship
between joints within the same limb (‘body-scrambling’
condition). The two scrambling schemes therefore
differed in how disruption was applied across the structure
of the agent (ﬁgure 1a–f ). However, both scrambling
schemes delivered the same amount of overall noise to the
observer, rendering the distinction between limb- and
body-scrambling trials immaterial to a system that does
not represent the limbs as separate perceptual units. For
such a system, the unit of representation would be the
whole body of the agent, and at the level of the whole body
there was no difference in the amount of scrambling
between the two conditions (see later in §3f o ra
demonstration that these considerations are not invali-
dated by low-level cues, and see §4 for more details).
We measured the threshold amount of scrambling
corresponding to correct identiﬁcation of the target on
75 per cent of the trials. If the human visual system
processes agents as perceptual wholes without prior
representation of their subparts, then human sensitivity
should be affected equally by the two scrambling
manipulations and there should be no difference in
scrambling thresholds between limb- and body-scrambling
conditions. By contrast, if motion signals are initially
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Figure 1. Limb- and body-selective scrambling of joint trajectories. (a) Schematic of a point-light agent consisting of 12 body
joints and the head (the scrambling procedure is illustrated here for one agent only, but the actual stimulus contained two
agents). Only three (randomly chosen) limbs were sampled (indicated by black dots) resulting in nine joint trajectories per agent
(the head was never sampled). (a,b) In the ‘target’stimulus, the same temporal segment (indicated by grey shading) was sampled
for all trajectories (black rectangles are vertically aligned in (b). (c–f ) In the ‘non-target’ stimulus, the nine trajectories were
grouped into three triplets (one colour per triplet). The sampling segment for each triplet was shifted by a randomly selected
amount (indicated by the coloured arrows)resulting in temporal dephasing (the coloured rectangles are misaligned in (d,f )). No
dephasing was present within each triplet (rectangles of the same colour are aligned). (c,d) In the body-scrambling condition,
agiventriplet comprised joints coming from the same limb, i.e. each triplet corresponded to one limb (c). This triplet assignment
resulted in scrambling across limbs (rectangles sampling different limbs are misaligned in (d)), but no scrambling within
individual limbs (rectangles sampling the same limb are aligned in (d)). (e,f ) In the limb-scrambling condition, a given triplet
comprised joints coming from different limbs (e). For example, the red triplet in (e) consists of one joint from the right arm (right
shoulder), one joint from the right leg (right foot) and a third joint from the left leg (left knee). This triplet assignment resulted in
scrambling within each limb (e.g. misaligned rectangles for the right arm (joints numbered 1–2–3) in (f)), but no scrambling
across limbs (the same overall temporal region is sampled for each limb in (f)). The only distinguishing feature between limb
scrambling and body scrambling was the way in which the individual joint trajectories were grouped into triplets; all other
sampling manipulations were identical. See the electronic supplementary material ﬁlm for animated versions of the stimuli. (g)
Two-stage scheme for a qualitative interpretation of the data. Stage 1 in the processing hierarchy assembles the moving dots into
limbs; stage 2 assembles limbs into the full percept of an agent. Limb scrambling (red) places the bottleneck for processing at
stage 1; body scrambling (blue) places it at stage 2. (h) Consequently, the non-target stimulus only reaches stage 1 on limb-
scrambling trials, but is able to reach stage 2 on body-scrambling trials (ﬁlled bars above non-target label). The target stimulus
(never scrambled) completes stage 2 (ﬁlled bar above target label). The perceptual difference between target and non-target is
indicated by the ﬁlled double-headed arrows, and is larger on limb-scrambling trials (red) compared with body-scrambling trials
(blue). Following inversion, which is hypothesized to knock out stage 2, all stimuli are pushed back to stage 1 in the processing
hierarchy (open bars). The perceptual difference between target and non-target is decreased by this manipulation on limb-
scrambling trials (compare red ﬁlled arrow with open double-headed arrow), but remains unaffected on body-scrambling trials
(compare blue ﬁlled arrow with open double-headed arrow).
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individual limbs (stage 1) and limbs are subsequently
assembled for the purpose of retrieving whole agents
(stage 2), and if these two stages are represented separately
i nt h en e u r a lc i r c u i t r y ,w em a ye x p e c tad i f f e r e n c ei nt h e
threshold measurements.
The results supported the latter hypothesis: scrambling
thresholds were better on limb-scrambling trials than on
body-scrambling trials by a factor of approximately 2
(ﬁlled symbols in ﬁgure 2a lie above the unity line; paired
t-test for limb- versus body-scrambling thresholds returns
p!0.002; when data point for non-naive observer (right-
ward-pointing triangle) is removed p!0.01). This result,
which we refer to as the ‘limb-discriminabilityObody-
discriminability’ effect, is consistent with the following
two-stage interpretation (ﬁgure 1g): in the body-scram-
bling condition, both the target and non-target stimuli
reach stage 2 in the processing hierarchy because the limbs
are left unperturbed. In the limb-scrambling condition,
the non-target stimulus does not progress beyond stage 1
because individual limbs are scrambled (ﬁlled bars in
ﬁgure 1h). This leads to a greater perceptual difference
between target and non-target in the limb-scrambling
condition because the two stimuli are represented at
different stages, resulting in better discriminability (ﬁlled
double-headed arrows in ﬁgure 1h). This effect is
sufﬁciently strong that it can be demonstrated qualitatively
by viewing the stimuli in the electronic supplementary
material ﬁlm, where it can be seen that, for a given
scrambling level, limb scrambling degrades the percept of
agency more than body scrambling.
(b) The effect is not due to low-level cues/artefacts
It is possible that, even when the overall amount of
scrambling between the two conditions is equated, the two
types of scrambling manipulations may involve differences
in low-level cues unrelated to agency. For example, it is
possible that dots tended to be further apart from each
other on limb-scrambling trials as opposed to body-
scrambling trials or vice versa (spatio-temporal proxi-
mity), and that observers were using this low-level cue (or
others such as local rigidity) to perform the task of
discriminating target from non-target. In this case, the
limb-discriminabilityObody-discriminability effect would
not inform us about the processing of agency, but about
uninteresting aspects of our stimuli.
This possibility is very unlikely, because it would
predict that the effect should be larger for thresholds
that were measured in the presence of large amounts of
scrambling, and smaller for thresholds in the lower
scrambling threshold, limb
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Figure 2. Limb discriminability is better than body discriminability. (a) Thresholds for the limb- and body-scrambling
conditions are plotted on x- and y-axes, respectively (see §2 for the deﬁnition of scrambling units). Filled symbols refer to
upright agents, and lie above the unity line (shown by solid line). Open symbols refer to inverted agents, and fall on the unity line
(see main text for statistics). Inset shows average values (G1 s.e.m. across observers) for all four conditions (ﬁlled for upright
and open for inverted). (b) The ratio between upright and inverted thresholds is plotted for both limb- and body-scrambling
conditions on x- and y-axes, respectively. Solid line shows unity line, dotted lines mark unity for individual axes. Vertical double-
headed arrow shows observer average (G1 s.e.m. across observers) for the body-scrambling condition, demonstrating that
upright/inverted ratios for this condition do not differ from unity (points fall on the horizontal dotted line). Black horizontal
double-headed arrow shows observer average for the limb-scrambling condition, demonstrating that upright/inverted ratios for
this condition are smaller than unity (points lie to the left of the vertical dotted line) and fall within the range expected from
previous studies (indicated by grey horizontal double-headed arrow, which shows the meanG1 s.e.m. of 15 threshold ratios for
discriminating the ﬁghting stimuli obtained from Neri et al. 2006, 2007). In both (a,b), error bars show G1 s.e.m. (not visible
when smaller than symbol), and different symbols refer to eight different observers.
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Figure 3. Body processing takes longer than limb processing.
Time thresholds (in units of s) for limb- and body-scrambling
conditions, plotted on x- and y-axes, respectively, lie above
the unity line (indicated by solid line). The dashed line marks
a y/x ratio of 2. Inset shows average values (G1 s.e.m. across
observers) for both conditions.
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that are used by the observer, such cues should become
increasingly pronounced as the intensity of scrambling
gets larger (indeed, when scramblingZ0, there is no
distinction between limb- and body-scrambling con-
ditions). In the log–log plot of ﬁgure 2a, this would
predict that data points should move further away from
the unity line (larger difference between limb- and body-
scrambling thresholds) as they get closer to the upper right
corner of the plot (larger scrambling values for the two
conditions). This is clearly not the case, in fact the data
conformed to the opposite trend (a correlation coefﬁcient
of K0.78 between the ratio of the threshold values for the
two conditions and their mean; i.e. data points move
closer to the unity line as they get closer to the upper right
corner of the plot). We conclude that low-level cues are
unlikely to be the source of the differential effect we
observed for the ﬁlled symbols in ﬁgure 2a. To further
corroborate this conclusion, we ran a control experiment.
We inverted the entire stimulus upside down. It is well
known that upside down point-light agents are poorly
perceived as meaningful human actors (Sumi 1984;
Profﬁtt&Bertenthal1990;Ahlstrometal.1997;Pavlova&
Sokolov 2000; Tadin et al. 2002; Neri et al. 2006, 2007),
so this manipulation effectively disrupted the percept
of agency normally conveyed by this class of
stimuli. However, it preserved all low-level structure in
the stimulus. If low-level cues resulted in the limb-
discriminabilityObody-discriminability effect, then the
effect should not be affected by inversion. If, however,
the effect was caused by the percept of agency in the
ﬁghting scene, inverting the stimulus should eliminate any
differential effect between the two conditions. We repeated
our threshold measurements using inverted stimuli and
found that the difference between the two conditions was
entirely eliminated (open symbols fall on the unity line in
ﬁgure 2a; a paired t-test for limb- versus body-scrambling
thresholds returns pZ0.67; when the data point for a non-
naive observer is removed pZ0.85). Combined with the
previous observations, these results lead to the conclusion
that low-level cues are not the source of the limb-
discriminabilityObody-discriminability effect. More
generally, the results from the control experiment
demonstrate that this effect is a reﬂection of the way in
which the stimuli are represented by the brain, not of the
way in which they were constructed by the experimenter.
These results also demonstrate that our scrambling
protocol did achieve the desired goal of matching the
overall amount of scrambling between the two conditions.
Had it not been matched, there is no reason to expect
that inversion should lead to limb discriminabilityZ
body discriminability.
(c) Differential effect of inversion on limb
discriminability and body discriminability
In going from the main experiment to the control
experiment just described (transition between ﬁlled and
open symbols in ﬁgure 2a), thresholds for limb- and body-
scrambling conditions could have become equal either
because the body-scrambling threshold improved, or the
limb-scrambling threshold degraded, or a combination of
both effects. It is clear from ﬁgure 2a that only one trend
was observed: data points shifted rightwards from ﬁlled to
open, indicating that limb-scrambling thresholds were
degraded by inversion (a paired t-test for inverted versus
upright returns p!0.003), but the body-scrambling
thresholds were left unaffected (pZ0.47). The differential
effect of inversion on the two main conditions is
demonstrated on a subject-by-subject basis by replotting
the data in ﬁgure 2a as upright/inverted ratios in ﬁgure 2b.
The average ratio for the limb-scrambling condition was
approximately 1/2 (see black horizontal double-headed
arrow), in excellent agreement with previous measure-
ments of this phenomenon (Neri et al. 2006, 2007) (grey
horizontal double-headed arrow). By contrast, the average
ratio for the body-scrambling condition was approxi-
mately 1 (vertical double-headed arrow). Across individ-
ual variations, the effect of inversion was signiﬁcantly more
pronounced in the limb scrambling as opposed to the
body-scrambling condition (points lie above the unity
line in ﬁgure 2b; a paired t-test for body- versus limb-
scrambling upright/inverted ratios returns p!0.02).
The most parsimonious explanation to account for the
entire dataset reported in ﬁgure 2 is that inversion disrupts
stage 2 more than stage 1. In this scenario, the target and
non-target stimuli would be disrupted equally by this
manipulation on body-scrambling trials because both
stimuli reached stage 2 in the upright conﬁguration for
this condition. The perceptual difference between the two
would therefore remain similar (compare blue ﬁlled with
open double-headed arrows in ﬁgure 1h), leading to no
change in discriminability (as we observed experimen-
tally). On limb-scrambling trials, on the other hand, the
bottleneck for processing the non-target stimulus is at
stage 1, while the target stimulus is still processed by stage
2. Under the proposed scenario, inversion would disrupt
the target stimulus more than the non-target stimulus,
thus reducing the perceptual difference between the two
and leading to poorer discriminability (as we observed;
compare red ﬁlled with open double-headed arrows in
ﬁgure 1h). This interpretation also predicts that, following
inversion, limb discriminabilityZbody discriminability
(as we observed), because the inverted non-target is
processed mainly by the same stage (1) in both conditions
(open bars and double-headed arrows in ﬁgure 1h). All
other possibilities fail to account satisfactorily for our
results as they predict either no effect of inversion (if
inversion is hypothesized to affect both stages equally or
not affect them at all) or better discriminability on limb-
scrambling trials following inversion (if inversion is
hypothesized to affect stage 1 more than stage 2). We
conclude that impairment by inversion, which is com-
monly used as the higher level signature in studies of
biological motion (Sumi 1984; Profﬁtt & Bertenthal 1990;
Ahlstrom et al. 1997; Pavlova & Sokolov 2000; Tadin et al.
2002; Neri et al. 2006, 2007), is mainly due to disruption
of processing beyond the limb stage, after the limbs have
been recovered but still need to be assembled into an
agent. In turn, this indicates that top-down knowledge
about the natural orientation of biological motion is fed
back more effectively to this stage, and less effectively (or
possibly not at all) to pre-limb stages.
(d) Different time scales for limb discriminability
and body discriminability
If the above interpretation is correct and stage 2 depends
on top-down feedback more than stage 1, we may expect
that processing the agents in the body-scrambling
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time scale than the limb-scrambling condition (which
relies on a comparison with stage 1), because feedback
requires time to be deployed. We tested this prediction by
measuring the threshold time required for discriminating
target from non-target. Instead of varying the amount of
scrambling which was applied to the non-target stimulus
as was done for the experiments in ﬁgure 2, we kept the
amount of scrambling ﬁxed at suprathreshold and varied
the duration of the stimuli (see §2). Discrimination in the
body-scrambling condition required more than double the
time needed in the limb-scrambling condition (points lie
above the unity line in ﬁgure 3; a paired t-test for limb-
versus body-scrambling thresholds returns p!0.01 (when
the data point for a non-naive observer is removed
p!0.02); mean ratio body scrambling/limb scramblingZ
2.38), consistent with the feedback interpretation
suggested by ﬁgure 2b. More speciﬁcally, the body-
scrambling condition required on average an additional
620 ms. This ﬁgure may seem large when compared with
the reported duration for feedback effects that mediate
low-level visual phenomena (Lamme 1995), but is
consistent with the extended time scale known to be
associated with the processing of complex motion (Neri
et al. 1998; Poom & Olsson 2002). Given the results in
ﬁgure 3, it is possible that the effect demonstrated in
ﬁgure 2 may show somedependence on stimulus duration.
4. DISCUSSION
(a) What is being probed by these experiments?
In the experiments described here, we adopted a 2AFC
protocol(whichispreferabletoayes–noparadigm;Green&
Swets 1966) and observers were explicitly instructed to
selecttheintervalcontainingthe stimulus that most closely
resembled a ﬁghting action between two human agents
(see §2). Is it possible that observers were nevertheless
detecting the noise, rather than the agency conveyed by
the signal? We can rule out this possibility in our
experiments because it is inconsistent with the effect we
observed following stimulus inversion (open symbols in
ﬁgure 2a). The inversion effect is widely recognized to
provide a signature of the processing of agency (Sumi
1984; Profﬁtt & Bertenthal 1990; Ahlstrom et al. 1997;
Pinto & Shiffrar 1999; Pavlova & Sokolov 2000; Tadin
et al. 2002; Neri et al. 2006, 2007); by contrast, there is no
logical reason to believe that this effect would be observed
for noise. Furthermore, the above-mentioned hypothesis
is inconsistent with the signiﬁcant time difference we
observed between limb- and body-scrambling conditions
(ﬁgure 3). Temporal integration has been shown to extend
over long time windows for the processing of agency (Neri
et al. 1998; Poom & Olsson 2002); by contrast, no
evidence suggests that such time scales would apply to a
low-level attribute as noise.
A relevant issue partly related to the one above
concerns the possibility that the two scrambling protocols
may not, in fact, deliver the same amount of noise.
Although matched for total power, the two scrambling
schemes may implement different degrees of spatio-
temporal proximity for correlated noise ﬂuctuations.
One simple way to visualize this issue is to think about
the different joints as pixels in an array. In the body-
scrambling condition, the perturbed pixels are clustered
into blocks (limbs); in the limb-scrambling condition, the
perturbed pixels are not clustered. This may have led to
the differential effect reported in ﬁgure 2a. However, the
above considerations apply equally to the inverted dis-
plays: spatio-temporal proximity is preserved by these
displays. If the effect reported by the ﬁlled symbols in
ﬁgure 2a depended solely on spatio-temporal proximity,
this effect should be unaffected by inversion, contrary to
what we observed. We can therefore rule out an
explanation based on spatio-temporal proximity alone.
However, we do not exclude a role for spatio-temporal
proximity in the early stages of structure retrieval (our
stage 1; see later §4f ).
(b) Which speciﬁc models are ruled out by
the results?
There is currently only one model of biological motion
(Lange & Lappe 2006) which has been formulated in
sufﬁcient detail to make quantitative prediction for
threshold experiments as those performed here. This
model would need to be modiﬁed in order to account for
our results, because it sums energy across all joints via
template matching with whole-body silhouettes and would
therefore respond equally to limb scrambling and body
scrambling. Moregenerally, wecan ruleout any ﬁrst-order
model that weights different joints independently, whether
using the same or different weights across joints. Again,
the simple analogy with the pixel array may be useful.
A ﬁrst-order model would correspond to a linear ﬁlter
applied by template matching with the array. The ﬁlter
may for example emphasize the feet over other joints
(in line with existing experimental evidence for the perce-
ption of locomotion; Troje & Westhoff 2006), but does
not capture second-order relationships between joints.
This model would fail to show the differential effect we
observed here because each joint is perturbed by the same
amount (on average) in both limb- and body-scrambling
conditions. The most direct implication of our results is
that joints must be integrated nonlinearly, and that the
integration process must be differentially deployed across
the body of the agent in a way that reﬂects a distinction
between joints within the same limb and joints belonging
to different limbs.
More generally, our results comprise a series of clear-cut
empirical effects against which to test future models of
subpartprocessingofagency.Anysuchfuturemodelshould
not only be able to demonstrate a difference between limb
scrambling and body scrambling, but this difference should
also be in the speciﬁc direction of limb discriminabilityO
body discriminability. Notably, the same model must
demonstrate no such difference for inverted stimuli, and
most importantly must be able to capture the clear-cut
empirical result that inversion only affected thresholds for
oneconditionandnottheother(ﬁgure2b).Finally,thesame
model must plausibly account for a time difference in the
processing associated with the two conditions of more than
0.5 s. This new set of quantitative observations adds
signiﬁcantly to existing empirical constraints on compu-
tational models for visual processing of human agency.
(c) Representation of limbs as body parts
Previous studies of biological motion have manipulated the
trajectories of individual joints (Profﬁtt & Bertenthal 1990;
Blake et al. 2003; Neri et al. 2006, 2007), and only
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complete removal of normal body structure (Pinto &
Shiffrar 1999; Thompson et al. 2005). Neither of these
studies perturbed the structure of individual limbs while
preserving the relationship among them (as was done here
for the limb-scrambling condition), nor did they match the
overall level of perturbation across conditions (a feature of
our design that was central to the comparison between our
two main experimental manipulations). This was also the
case for previous studies on the perception of static bodies
and isolated limbs (Reed et al. 2006), which addressed an
altogether different issue. It is clear from these studies that
humans can create perceptual representations of individual
limbs as well as whole bodies. The central question is
whether the representation of whole bodies must rely on
prior representation of their parts, or whether the two
representations exist separately as wholes. Our experiments
demonstrate that, for the purpose of visual detection, the
representation of whole agents relies on prior represen-
tations of body fragments comprising more than one joint
but limited to a limb or similar subpart.
(d) Speciﬁcity of the inversion effect
The results in ﬁgure 2 provide the ﬁrst example, to my
knowledge, in the literature of a differential effect of
inversion on the same task and target stimulus. A set of
previous experiments has demonstrated a differential effect
of inversion onstatic pictures of whole bodies asopposedto
static pictures of isolated limbs (Reed et al. 2006), but the
two sets of stimuli differed so markedly that task and target
conditions were also very different, making it difﬁcult to
pinpoint which factors determined the differential effect of
inversionon the two classes of pictures. In our experiments,
these confounds were not present as there was only one
difference between the two conditions we studied, namely
the type of scrambling manipulation that was applied to the
non-target; other than that, observers were performing the
same task attempting to identify the same target on all trials
and were not aware of any difference in the scrambling
protocols between limb- and body-scrambling trials (at the
end of data collection, each naive observer was asked
whether they had noted any difference in the nature of
scrambling for different trials, and none of them reported
noticing any difference). In addition, we used moving
point-light stimuli rather than static pictures, making our
results immediately relevant to action representation.
Because previous studies of inverted biological motion
have not focused on the distinction between whole and
parts, they have applied scrambling indiscriminately across
the agent (Grossman & Blake 2001; Neri et al. 2007)o r
theydidnotscrambletheagentatall(Sumi1984;Pavlova &
Sokolov 2000). These studies exposed an inversion effect
but it could only be interpreted in general terms. Our
results take a ﬁrst step in the direction of dissecting this
effect,whichalsooccursforfaces(Valentine1988;Martelli
et al. 2005), by demonstrating that it is quantitatively
accountedforbyreferencetoonlyasubsetoftheprocessing
operations that subserve agent identiﬁcation.
(e) Predictions for future imaging and electro-
physiological experiments
The role of body-part processing has been investigated in
previous studies by dismembering the agent via displace-
ment of the limbs apart from their approximate position
within the body (Pinto & Shiffrar 1999; Thompson et al.
2005) or by presenting limbs in isolation (Bonda et al.
1996; Seitz 2002; Reed et al. 2006). Both manipulations
have been used in the imaging literature, but the resulting
data are difﬁcult to interpret in the context of the speciﬁc
question asked here. When the agent is taken apart,
observers adopt entirely different task strategies most
likely involving attentional tracking of individual body
parts; this interpretation has been used to account for
larger activity in response to dismembered agents as
opposed to intact ones in parietal areas commonly
associated with object tracking (Thompson et al. 2005;
attentional tracking of individual stimulus items was
deliberately minimized for our displays by the use of a
limited-lifetime sampling technique (Neri et al. 1998), see
§2 and the electronic supplementary material ﬁlm). When
body parts are presented in isolation and the resulting
brain activity is compared with viewing full bodies, speciﬁc
brain areas respond to either class of stimuli (Bonda et al.
1996). This, however, is not necessarily an indication that
full bodies are processed in two stages; rather, it may
reﬂect a specialization for perceiving full bodies as wholes
in one area, and a completely separate specialization for
perceiving body parts in a different area. Indeed, this
interpretation has been used to account for recent results
from a series of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation experiments involving visual presentation of static
body postures (Urgesi et al. 2007). Our results predict
that if an area exists for the speciﬁc purpose of proces-
sing whole agents, as seems to be indicated by various
imaging studies (see Peelen & Downing (2007) for a
recent review), either activity in this area must be
dependent upon activity in a separate area where body
fragments such as limbs are processed, or limbs must
be processed and represented within the same area at a
scale that is not resolved by conventional functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements. The
former hypothesis may be tested by performing correla-
tional analyses of inter-area activity (Friston 1994), the
latter by probing local circuitry using fMR-adaptation
paradigms (Krekelberg et al. 2006).
As well as predicting that subpart representations
would exist within the circuitry that supports whole
agent processing, or that such representations would be
fed onto this circuitry from a separate module, our results
predict that the associated neural processes should occur
at different time scales. We observed a difference of more
than 0.5 s between limb- and body-scrambling conditions;
this time scale may be beyond the temporal resolution
of fMRI measurements, but it is well within the range
that can be resolved by magnetoencephalographic or
visually evoked potential experiments. We predict that this
class of electrophysiological measurements would expose
two different stages occurring sequentially and separated
by approximately 600 ms. The two associated electro-
physiological markers should also be highly correlated,
in the sense that the occurrence and size of the second
event should be conditional upon the characteristics of
the earlier one.
(f) Implications for theories of action processing
Early models of biological motion perception emphasized
a bottom-up approach based on invariant structural pro-
perties of the skeleton frame and its natural kinematics,
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Cutting 1981) and rigidity constraints (Hoffman &
Flinchbaugh 1982; Webb & Aggarwal 1982). Later
models have introduced higher level templates to
implement a top-down strategy; the templates are typically
derived from a library of whole-body poses and actions
(Giese & Poggio 2003; Lange & Lappe 2006). These
models have not incorporated explicit subpart represen-
tations (although these were implied by variants of
recognition-by-parts theoretical frameworks; Marr &
Vaina 1982), and lacked the experimental evidence to
indicate whether and how they should rely on bottom-up
versus top-down processing. Our results are directly
relevant to this issue and essentially support a mixed
bottom-up top-down model (which shares similarities
with Giese & Poggio 2003). Stage 1 implements a
structure-retrieval algorithm for the assembly of local
motion signals into body fragments, possibly driven
mainly by bottom-up information (e.g. spatio-temporal
proximity, rigidity). However, the process that sub-
sequently identiﬁes the relevant fragments (e.g. limbs)
and assembles them into a whole agent (stage 2) must be
of top-down nature if the model is to explain the effect of
inversion we report in ﬁgure 2. In addition, this process
may be generative (Barlow 1985) and may start operating
before stage 1 is completed; the two stages would then
interact and reﬁne each other in a recursive feed-forward–
feedback fashion.
In the context of biological motion, a part-based
representationallowsforﬂexibleencodingofalargevariety
of agents and actions using a small number of basic
components (Marr & Vaina 1982). This strategy brings
obvious advantages to a system with limited neural
resources that would otherwise face the curse of dimen-
sionality (Biederman 1987). However, it has been recog-
nized that this strategy works effectively only if the class of
objects to be recognized is well captured by the chosen
library of part components (Ullman 1996). In the context
ofagentrecognition,itappearsthatlimbswouldsatisfythis
condition as they are clearly essential features of most
terrestrial creatures and are very homogeneous across
animals: limbs almost invariably conform to the three-
jointedstructurethatisidealforlocomotion(Nagle1995),
and are so fundamental to the body plan of animals that
their number can be accurately predicted by remarkably
simple equations incorporating only the most basic body
structural information (Changizi 2001). Moreover, limbs
belong to the class of intermediate complexity features
that have been proposed to play a critical role in visual
classiﬁcation (Ullman et al. 2002). Our experiments indi-
cate that the human visual system may attach speciﬁc
signiﬁcance to this unit of body representation.
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